In the current post-crisis period, the implementation of Corporate Governance principles has proven to be important. The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development considers failure of Corporate Governance as one of the causes of the latest financial and economic crisis. We assume that the higher quality of institutional environment point to higher performance of the economy. The aim of the paper is to quantify the implementation of Corporate Governance in the European Union through selected qualitative indicators and his impact on economies. We have verified that countries with better values of judicial independence, protection of property rights, corruption, minority investor protection, extent of conflict of interest and resolving insolvency have a higher value of gross domestic product per capita. The index of enforcing contracts was statistically insignificant.
Introduction
Corporate Governance has been more intensively processed after economic crisis of 2008, when the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) identified the failure of Corporate Governance as one of the main causes of this deep recession (Kirkpatrick, 2009) . According Klimiková and Muchová (2017) : "weak and ineffective governance of financial institutions has been widely cited as an important contributory factor in the massive failure of financial sector decision making that led to the global financial crisis". Author's collective Hučka, Malý and Okruhlica (2007) defines the term of Corporate Governance "as an issues of proprietary relationships and systems by which owners exercise their proprietary rights and control over the management area of the company; at the same time, Corporate Governance includes processes, structures and relationships, by which administrative authorities supervise the work of their executive staff." "In the wake of the crisis, financial institution governance was too often revealed as a set of arrangements that approved risky strategies, was blind to the dangers on the balance sheet and in the global economy (Klimiková & Muchová, 2017) ".
Based on the experience of Corporate Governance failures since the 1970s, firms implemented principles and rules into its internal processes in form of written Codes and in form of establishment of responsible positions: "In order to abide by the rules of corporate governance several companies have appointed also "Chief Governance Officers" and yet, there is still some confusion about what these officers do. There is a disparity between what these officers actually do, as practice depends on the company's circumstances. Moreover, there is also great disparity between what is "written" in the corporate governance code and corporate governance practices "done" (controversy between perception and reality) (Knapik & Krajčík, 2012) ." Corporate Governance is usually processed as microeconomic issues, however, by Kittová and Steinhauser (2017) processed this theme especially in the context of the interaction between the institutional and macroeconomic environment of companies. In this way, the paper contains evidence and arguments for a constant effort to improve the institutional environment of companies. The authors assumed that the better quality of the institutional environment means better macroeconomic conditions; and vice versa -favourable macroeconomic conditions have a positive impact on the quality of the institutional environment. The role of the state should be to support the protection of property rights, further on in the constant effort to suppress corruption and to promote the access of enterprises to sources of financing. Companies should further implement the principles of Corporate Governance into their internal processes. In this way, they will gain better access to financial sources and gain a competitive advantage at the organizational level.
Corporate Governance is theoretically explained most often in the background of the new institutional economic theory and in the theory of transaction costs. The theoretical basis for Corporate Governance was mainly provided by the work and definition of governance structures by the Nobel Prize winner for Economist Williamson (1990) . The amount of transaction costs is difficult to quantify, but author Okruhlica (2013) recommends using qualitative indices, in this case competitiveness indices. An analogue approach has chosen by author's team, Hasan, Kobeissi and Song (2014) , applied quantitative analysis on Corporate Governance, specifically multiregional analysis. Steinhauser (2015) used as a measure the amount transaction costs and as at the same times an indicator of the institutional environment quality -the credit derivatives, namely Credit Default Swaps (CDS). Index of Institutional Environment expressed using Credit Default Swaps represents a negative value the CDS premium on the underlying asset (sovereign debt bonds of EU countries). The deterioration of the country's risk exposure represents an increase in amount of transaction costs, which is accompanied by an increase in the CDS premium, ie the decrease in the value of the institutional measurement index using the CDS. In our case, the CDS premium was used as a control variable to illustrate a complex model image.
Methodology
Corporate Governance is difficult to quantify. This is related to the problematic methodology for measuring the amount of transaction costs. However, we have applied a quantitative analysis of qualitative indicators. We assume that the higher quality of institutional environment level to higher performance of the economy. Aim of our paper is to quantify the implementation of Corporate Governance in the European Union (expect Luxembourg and Malta) through selected qualitative indicators. These variables and their choices have tried to adapt to the usual content of Corporate Governance theory. The Corporate Governance implementation level correlates indirectly with the level of transaction costs in the institutional environment. Higher amount of index values presents higher institutional quality. We assume that the higher value of the selected indexes indicates a higher quality of the institutional environment and a better implementation of the Corporate Governance principles. An even implementation principle of Corporate Governance represents the transaction cost, but in a better institutional environment this implementation is less costly. These assumptions outputs are the same as in paper Kittová & Steinhauser (2017) . Our work follows this paper and presents a continuation and deepening the analysis of other indexes. The implemented a descriptive and multiregional analysis, which we have processed in Gretl and the results were interpreted according to the literature (Pacáková et al., 2009; Lukáčik, Lukáčiková, Szomolá-nyi, 2011) . WDescription and source of variables shows table 1.
Tab. 1 Description of variables

Variables
Description and source
GDP per capita (current US$) 2015
Gross 
Results and Discussion
In order to achieve the main aim of our paper we proceeded to quantitative analysis. Table 2 contains input data descriptive statistics. We analysed 26 EU countries except Luxembourg and Malta (N). The average GDP per capita was around 27,800 USD. The average value of the CDS Index was at -181 USD. The fact is that a higher index value means a higher quality of the institutional environment. For our needs is interesting kurtosis and skewness. Kurtosis value higher than 1 means, that dataset contains observations (states) with a variable value higher than normal distribution. In our case, we can say, that GDP per capita is divided normally within the countries surveyed; on the other hand, we have seen significant extreme observation.
Skewness reveals the shape of the distribution. Positive rate skewness means a positive, right-handed asymmetric distribution (there are a larger number of countries with an index value less than the average). The result of the regression analysis between GDP per capita and Protection of Property Rights is shown in Table 4 . Statistical significance is similar Table 3 . In this case, we expect an increase of GDP per capita by 9,092 USD with an increase in the index by 1 point. The lowest value of this index is Hungary (4.08 points Protection of Property Rights, GDP per capita 12 363 USD), the highest value of Finland (9.04 points of Protection of Property Rights, GDP per capita 42 311 USD). Proprietary rights protection is an essential component of Corporate Governance. The quality of the legal system, we can only recommend increasing the quality of the institutional environment in the field of property rights. (Liška et al., 2011) . Its suppression, based on our analysis, contributes to a substantial increase in the performance of the economy by enhancing the quality of the institutional environment. WBG, 2017a; WBG, 2017b; The Fraser Institute, 2014; Thomson Reuters, 2018. One of the partial areas of Corporate Governance and Codes is the protection of both majority and minority shareholders. These facts belong to the core of Corporate Governance theory. Regression analysis between GDP per capita and Subindex Strength of Minority Investor Protection is shown in Table 6 . For this model, the impact of the CDS index on economic performance as a control variable was also statistically significant. This model is based on F-statistics with lower reporting power and according to R-squared explains only 27 % of the observations. For this reason, we can only say that we expect an increase in economic performance with the growth of this variable country. The lowest value of this subindex is reached in Slovak Republic (2.72 points of the Strength of Minority Investor Protection, GDP per capita 16 088 USD). The highest value presents United Kingdom (7.8 points Strength of Minority Investor Protection, GDP per capita USD 43 876). The statistical significance of the model in Table 7 is equal to the previous model. In this case, we also assume that the growth of the Subindex Extent of Conflict of Interest Regulation increases the GDP per capita. The lowest value of this subindex is Hungary (4.0 points Subindex Extent of Conflict of Interest Regulation, GDP per capita 12 363 USD). The highest value presents United Kingdom (8.3 points of the Subindex Extent of Conflict of Interest Regulation, GDP per capita 43 876 USD). Conflict of interests is one of the most serious forms of corporate failure. Based on the regression model in 
Tab. 2 Descriptive Statistics
Tab. 5 Multiple Regression Analysis -Extra payments/bribes/favouritism
Tab. 6 Multiple Regression Analysis -Strength of minority investor protection index
Tab. 7 Multiple Regression Analysis -Extent of conflict of interest regulation index
Conclusion
We have confirmed the opinion that higher quality of institutional environment pointed to higher performance of the economy. It could be applied on EU countries, which were objects of our observation without Malta and Luxembourg. In our paper we confirmed the premise that implementation of Corporate Governance indirectly correlates with the level of transaction costs. Higher value of indexes indicates a higher quality of the institutional environment that means lower level of transaction costs and better implementation of the Corporate Governance principles. The implementation of corporate governance in form of principles or rules increases level of transaction costs however in a better institutional environment this implementation is less expensive. The strong linkage and the relationship between the variables are confirmed among GDP per capita and variables in table 3, 4, 5. It means that Judicial Independence; Protection of Property Rights; Extra Payments / Bribes / Favouritism significantly correlated with economic performance of countries as well as with implementation of Corporate Governance.
In other cases, models have low statistical significance, but the direction of the linkage indicates that with the increase in the quality of indices (Strength of Minority Investor Protection Index; Extent of Conflict of Interest Regulation Index; Resolving Insolvency) we can see also increase in quality of the implementation of Corporate Governance principles. These models also pointed out increasing of the economic performance measured by GDP per capita (analysis in table 6, 7, 9). In one case, the regression model between Subindex Enforcement Contracts and GDP per capita in Table 8 was not confirmed. We assumed that there will be a linkage, because the issue of Corporate Governance can be understood as prevention of economic failures on microeconomic level. Governance should avoid the risk of opportunism and thus increase enforcement of contracts. To our surprise, the linkage between these variables was not confirmed.
Here we have space to return in to the work of Wiliamson (1990) and his government structures which is related to the protection of contract failures from all contract parties. It is also related to the theoretical apparatus of opportunistic behaviour, asymmetric information and asset specificity. This also explains the selection of all factors that present the Corporate Governance implementation. This means connection between macro-and microeconomic perception. The performance of micro-level entities is reflected at the macroeconomic level. This means that the failure of economic subjects increases the risk of the crisis. To reduce the risk of the crisis, we recommend increasing the quality of implementation Corporate Governance principles by individual economic entities as well as for decision makers. This link and recommendation is found in much of the influential literature. We have confirmed this conclusion by updating of database and selecting of variable set. Authors Knapik and Krajcik (2012) claim that Corporate Governance failures triggered the 2008 economic crisis (careless implementation of the principles and rules). They also argue that respect for these principles has the potential to restore lost confidence in the financial sector to gain capital for further development of corporations and growth: "Companies that fail to reform their governance will find themselves in a competitive disadvantage when they try to obtain capital to finance growth. High governance standards must be seen in practices and results of corporate activities. Good corporate governance is not easy and it is neither formal nor ceremony. An efficient board of directors involves a combination of right people, the right structure, and the right processes. It is the real challenge to determine the right combination for each individual company. Each company and country should consider its own circumstances before choosing the best way to improve corporate governance and prevent corporate failures."
